not safe school design with respect to normal concerns (lockdown systems for non-hostile emergency scenarios like medical response events, or even more US-specific threats like armed intruder scenarios), but straight up on the order of. "assign all school personal asset values depending on how critical they are to the function of the facility. identify possible areas where intruders could access exposed exterior exhaust vents to gain entry to protected areas. if you removed every instance of the words "school" and "student" from this document it would sound like contingency plans for the white house.
Aggressor tools can be forced entry tools, vehicles, or surveil-
lance (visual/audio). Their weapons can be incendiary devices;
small arms (rifles and handguns); stand-off military-style weapons
(rocket propelled grenades or mortars); explosive devices; and
CBR agents. Their tactics run the gamut: moving vehicle bombs;
stationary vehicle bombs; exterior attacks (thrown objects like
rocks, Molotov cocktails, hand grenades, or hand-placed bombs);
stand-off weapons attacks (small arms, military or improvised
direct and indirect fire weapons); covert entries (gaining entry
by false credentials or circumventing security with or without
weapons); mail bombs (delivered to individuals or institutions);
airborne contamination (CBR agents used to contaminate the air,
water, or food supply to a school); and waterborne contamination
(CBR agents injected into the water supply of a school facility).
someone department minister (or whatever the US equivalent is) somewhere decided that all of these as well as long-distance covert sniper attacks and full-on small nuclear arms were enough of a threat to your average All-American High School that they should be considered with as much seriousness as GFCI-protecting outlets on bathroom counters.