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in reply to @cathoderaydude's post:

Based on this theory, SPSI personnel believed they understood the cause of the May 24, 2017, explosion and they developed a protocol to allow their personnel to safely drain the liquid from the remaining odorizers. SPSI personnel told the CSB that MRR had never informed them that the remaining MP odorizers might contain methanol, diesel, kerosene, or other contaminants. As a result, SPSI specifically developed its protocol to drain the remaining MP odorizers while avoiding conditions that could generate hydrogen and thus create high pressure inside the equipment.

...yikes

In addition, an MRR technician told the CSB that to “save a buck or two,” they sometimes use rainwater recovered from the ground inside tank containment areas instead of city water to dilute the hypochlorite

What?

You should probably be concerned when the safety inspectors show up, a lawer tries to prevent them from disussing risks with you, and the inspectors immediately run for shelter

When asked by a representative from a state agency why SPSI thought this operation would be safe – given that a similar approach to draining the MP odorizer had resulted in the May 24, 2017, explosion – the SPSI manager asserted, “If our science is right, this will be fine.”
Unable to directly engage SPSI about the safety issues regarding its plan and lacking confidence that MRR or SPSI understood either the cause of the May 24, 2017 incident or the full range of possible reactive chemistry involved, CSB investigators took shelter behind a shipping container (conex box) located behind a building more than 150 feet away from the SPSI operation