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#industrial control


I decided to ask ChatGPT a question I once had during a job interview before being hired on at my current company:

Tell me what to do as a cyber security professional working in an industrial control network when an HMI is compromised and human safety is possibly at risk

And its immediate response was to give me this answer:

If you're a cybersecurity professional working in an industrial control network and you suspect that an HMI (Human Machine Interface) is compromised with potential risks to human safety, it's crucial to take immediate and systematic steps to address the situation. Here's a general guideline:

  1. Isolate the Compromised System:
  • Identify the compromised HMI system and disconnect it from the network immediately to prevent further spread of the attack.
  • If possible, isolate the compromised system physically to ensure it cannot communicate with other networked devices.
  1. Notify Relevant Personnel:
  • Alert the appropriate personnel, including operations, management, and IT security teams, about the compromise.
    Activate the incident response team and emergency procedures as outlined in your organization's cybersecurity and safety policies.

This has me quite pissed off.

The thing that ChatGPT did here was assume that industrial control security is handled no differently than enterprise or general computing; this is dead wrong.

Industrial control involves human safety and taking an HMI out of the equation can actually make matters worse. There have been documented situations where making arbitrary decisions such as the recommended "disconnect it from the network" can trigger cascading effects or outcomes that are undesired.

Unplugging an HMI from a PLC and a control network as a whole could cause a ripple effect that puts human lives in danger. An HMI is basically a computer (but built to withstand a rugged environment) and a PLC (programmable logic controller) is the interface the HMI interacts with to make machines do things. I am simplifying things greatly here, but the point is that they're not regular computers.

ChatGPT correctly states to notify relevant personnel, but this both fails to put this at the start and doesn't mention someone like a plant manager or similar role. You need people who are familiar with the equipment to do things like lockout, shutdown, et cetera--in my field we call them "subject matter experts" or "SMEs".

If I am to hear of a compromised HMI, my instinct is to talk to the person overseeing the operations first and get them to help mitigate it before even dreaming of disconnecting anything unilaterally. I do not want to be responsible for or creating increased risk for human casualties.

This scares the fuck out of me.



This is a Twitter thread from July 2018 that I wanted to reshare on cohost. I'll be doing this on a regular basis until I run out of threads I wish to bring here!

I want to talk about how important industrial control is and why the general public is woefully unaware of how they interact with it on a daily basis.

This is a [chost] on SkyTrain, Vancouver's rapid transit system and how safe it is until users circumvent it.

SkyTrain has just about 80 KM of track and it's 100% automated. This means that when you walk on to any of the trains on any of the three lines, there is no driver. Because of this, it can achieve and has achieved 70 sec headings, meaning you don't have to wait long for a train.

More often than not it's about 120 sec but still few systems in the world can achieve this maximum frequency.

Its frequency is also its biggest Achilles heel when things go awry, but I'll touch on that shortly.

For the very curious, the trains use the Seltrac moving block system. This allows for the trains to run very close together to the point where trains can actually be right in front of each other with a few metres to spare.

To prevent people from going into the tracks, there are various sensors at entry points where humans could interact with the trains. The trains don't have anything to detect a human is in its path; it just knows where it is.

Or in some cases wildlife gets into the track. This is a new extension of the system and it's not too far from an interface zone, allowing for cougars to enter. The line was not operating at the time.

So optimally, trains know where they are and humans never enter the track. Unfortunately, it does break from time to time...

The way I look at our rapid transit system is like this: it's like an elevator. An elevator is designed to never kill you provided that you don't circumvent the safety controls.

So what happens when humans circumvent the safety controls by opening doors when the trains are stopped? A lot of things and it messes up the balance of the system.

SkyTrain operates using a third-rail system, meaning that electricity is provided by a rail on either side of the track to feed electricity. It is very easy to end up touching it if you are unaware.

Also the trains operate at 80 KM/h at maximum speed.

All of this means that if someone exits a stopped train, everything starts to go hairy fast.

First off, SkyTrain has to have the section of track where people are thought to be walking through turned off and to stop all trains from approaching the stations between them. This means that a huge section of track going both ways is now disabled.

Secondly, attendants have to assist the riders who opted to leave the trains with getting on to the platforms. This has to be completed before we can do anything further. It may take an hour or more.

So here's where the fun part comes in: what happens when you decide to knock out power to these trains? We lose the ability to trust their state.

That's right. We've lost the trains and now the system has no idea where any of them are.

To bring the trains back to life we cannot just turn them on and tell them to go to the next station. They themselves do not know where they are and the system does not have the ability to make them trust their current position.

These self-driving trains however have to meet requirements every few months by having them driven by an operator. Almost all attendants are trained to operate the train when need be--due to weather or maintenance.

So to fix this: we have to have the train sets driven into their nearest station one set at a time. This is the longest part because there are sections of track that are nearly 3 KM long.

Once this is done and we've ensured that nobody is in harm's way, we can have the system come back to life.

I've ridden this network every working day for the past decade and can [confidently] say that the system is very safe. However, the biggest problem it has is that when it breaks, people tend to get frustrated and cause the system to break further.

In 2017, the system recorded a record 151 mn passengers (compared to 117 mn in 2010) and on average the majority of system delays are caused by humans interacting with the trains either intentionally or unintentionally--I will not elaborate further.

(There is a train 069 BTW)

How this all ties into industrial control [(IC)] of course is that this is the very definition of one that the public uses every day and pays no attention to how it works. Often we talk about IC in power plants, natural resources, and elsewhere, but our mass transit systems are IC!

IC security is super important but it is also important to understand how much goes into making a good IC system work. It isn't just having to worry about security matters but to also plan for humans interfering with the operations of things.

So the next time you're stuck on a train, don't break the emergency seal. It may be 15 minutes for you but you may cause 120 minutes for others.

I should add: I don't work for TransLink! If I did I'd probably wouldn't be allowed to [chost] about this stuff. I work for a company that heavily uses industrial control so as a result I have an interest in how things like SkyTrain works!

Fun fact: I was DM'd by two TransLink employees asking me if I worked for them when this thread started to make the rounds locally. I literally just transposed my knowledge of industrial control to how these trains work! Knowledge of industrial control equipment is just something I gained from my career and it isn't hard for me to look at systems and figure out how they tick.



I posted this reply elsewhere but figured I'd share it here too.

Stuxnet was not only a complex attack but the whole operation was clandestine and intentionally vague in its origins. Nobody officially admitted to its creation even though it was produced by the United States and Israel. Russia is not unwise to these sort of attacks on its industrial control systems and unlike Iran is unlikely to fall victim to the same tactics due to the nature of the country being the source of such attacks themselves.

I would not rule out the possibility of a Ukraine or someone aligned with Ukraine attacking Russian industrial control systems, but Stuxnet was such a huge investment of time and money and it would be easy to tip one's hand very fast were the tactic to be used today. You're more likely to see someone on Twitter brag about finding some random water flow system for a distillery or some sort of traffic light system via Shodan than something like the 2015 Ukrainian power outage.

Basically, Stuxnet was a slow boil and is now too obvious to anyone familiar with this stuff. Would not rule it out, but I am not going to bet on it.

This is my line of work and thus y'all get a rare opinion about geopolitics from me.


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